HELSINKI — China is rapidly advancing a broad spectrum of counterspace capabilities as part of a sustained push to secure military power in orbit, according to a new report.
The Secure World Foundation’s Global Counterspace Capabilities report 2025, released April 3, offers an updated and comprehensive analysis of various nations’ counterspace developments, focusing on technologies and strategies that could threaten space assets.
It states that China has implemented a sustained effort to develop a broad range of offensive counterspace capabilities, and details a number of activities in the areas of direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) systems, co-orbital ASAT, rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO), directed energy weapons and electronic warfare (EW).
“Over the last decade, China has engaged in multiple tests of technologies and capabilities that either are offensive counterspace weapons or could be used as such,” the report states.
While covering long-term developments, the report includes new activities over the past year. Notably, it suggests that China has deployed an experimental satellite in geostationary orbit (GEO) to practice space-based jamming, citing People’s Liberation Army reports which state, for example, that their existing jamming techniques don’t work on certain types of GEO communications satellites and calls for research into new techniques and strategies. The report could not identify which Chinese satellite or satellites have been conducting experimental space-based jamming.
“China has also begun developing the policy, doctrine, and organizational frameworks to support the integration of counterspace capabilities into its military planning and operations,” the report finds.
Anti-satellite capabilities
One major focus of the Secure World Foundation report is anti-satellite tests. China is believed to have at least one, and as many as three, direct-ascent ASAT (anti-satellite) systems, or DA-ASAT.
Its LEO DA-ASAT capabilities are deemed likely mature and may be operationally fielded on mobile launchers, while its capability for medium Earth orbit (MEO) or GEO targets are considered likely to still be in the experimental or developmental stage.
Proximity operations
Several Chinese satellites, including Shiyan-24C, TJS-3, TJS-10, and Shijian-17, have conducted RPO activities, in both low Earth orbit (LEO) and GEO. RPO capabilities support intelligence gathering and possibly counterspace functions. While these technologies could support co-orbital ASAT capabilities, there is no public evidence of their use for destructive purposes.
The report also notes that China’s secretive reusable spaceplane released an object in May 2024 during its now-concluded third flight and then practiced proximity maneuvers.
Another mission of note was the Shijian-25 satellite launched towards GEO in January for “satellite fuel replenishment and life extension service technology verification.”
China is also developing an extensive network of ground-based optical telescopes and radars to detect, track, and characterize space objects, enhancing its space situational awareness capabilities, as well as adding on-orbit SSA assets.
Electronic Warfare and Directed Energy Weapons
China is also believed to possess significant electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, particularly for jamming Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and satellite communications, though specific operational details are scarce. The move, echoed by Russia, is seen as countering the dominance of commercial satellite constellations, particularly SpaceX’s Starlink.
There are indications of research and development in directed energy weapons (DEW) for counterspace applications, but limited information is available regarding their operational status.
Strategic restructuring and opacity
It is unknown to the outside world how strong Chinese budgetary support for its counterspace activities is.
“Little reliable information has been provided on the budget for China’s entire space program, let alone its budget for counterspace technologies,” the report states. “It is likely that in relative terms, China spends much less on space than the United States, yet still manages to fund an extensive and robust program.”
If and how these capabilities will be wielded is unclear, however, underscoring strategic ambiguity.
“China’s considerable investment in developing and testing counterspace capabilities, suggest[s] it sees space as a domain for future conflicts, whether or not that is officially stated,” it reads. “That said, it is uncertain whether China would fully utilize its offensive counterspace capabilities in a future conflict or whether the goal is to use them as a deterrent against US aggression,” the report adds.
In another related development, China disbanded the Strategic Support Force in 2024, replacing it with the Information Support Force—a reorganization that emphasizes information warfare.
Global picture
The full report covers activities of major players including the United States, Russia, China, India—all of which have conducted debris-creating ASAT tests—and those who are developing counterspace technologies, such as Australia, France, Japan, Iran, Israel, North Korea, South Korea and the United Kingdom.
It finds that while there is a proliferation of research and development into counterspace capabilities globally, only non-destructive counterspace capabilities are being used in active military conflicts.
